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INTRODUCTION
“If this ruling is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to answer . . .
that were we considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate
we would have no doubts.  But Federal Baseball held the business of baseball
outside the scope of the Act. . . . We, therefore, conclude that the orderly way to elim-
inate error or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation
and not by court decision.”1
To be a successful Major League Baseball franchise requires hard work
and dedication by a team of great players and knowledgeable coaches, cou-
pled with sound on-field decisionmaking, and a little luck.  It also helps to
have a lot of money.  In the 2013 season, nearly half of major league teams
spent more than $100 million on player salaries.2  In professional sports the
“[t]eams with impressive records tend to show bigger revenues than teams in
the cellar” largely because “[t]he richest teams enjoy competitive advantages”
such as “the ability to bid for free agents or to pay to keep their own players
who opt for free agency,” and “the ability to hire top notch staffs.”3  For the
Oakland Athletics, however, such a high payroll figure is not a realistic
option while playing in O.co Coliseum, an outdated stadium in desperate
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; Bachelor of Arts in
Business Administration, University of Washington, 2010.  This Note is dedicated in loving
memory to my father, Danny Bryant, who always motivated me to work hard and exceed
expectations.  I would like to thank Kathryn Hotaling for her unwavering love and support,
as well as my mother and step-father, Beth and Glenn Blevens, for always believing in me.
Finally, I would like to thank Dean Ed Edmonds for his assistance in reading drafts of this
Note and providing valuable guidance.  All errors are my own.
1 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (footnote omitted).
2 2013 Baseball Payrolls, List, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 1, 2013, 1:57 PM), http://www.cbs
sports.com/mlb/story/21989238/baseball-payrolls-list.
3 Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1341–42
(N.D. Ill. 1991).
1841
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need of repair that the Commissioner of Major League Baseball bluntly calls
“a pit.”4
Just thirty-five miles south of Oakland, however, the City of San Jose has
attempted to give the Athletics an opportunity to do better.  The city agreed
in 2011 to help the Athletics build a new stadium in San Jose, and the San
Jose City Council executed an agreement that gave the team a two-year
option to purchase land owned by the city to build a new stadium.5  However,
the team has been prevented from taking further action by Major League
Baseball while the league considers whether to approve the team’s move.6
Tired of waiting on baseball, the City of San Jose decided to file a lawsuit
against Major League Baseball for tortious interference and violation of state
and federal antitrust laws.7  However, the city’s legal efforts ran into an even
larger roadblock: Major League Baseball has historically enjoyed an exemp-
tion from federal antitrust laws that bars any claims that baseball’s conduct
violates antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court first held that professional baseball was exempt
from federal antitrust laws in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs.8  In what would later be referred to as “not
one of [his] happiest days,”9 Justice Holmes reasoned that the business of
baseball was not a subject of interstate commerce and thus was not within the
scope of Sherman Antitrust Act,10 which meant that anticompetitive behavior
engaged in by organized baseball was not challengeable under the Act.11
The Court confronted the applicability of the antitrust laws to profes-
sional baseball again in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.12  Rather than revisit
the questionable reasoning that baseball was not interstate commerce or
trade, the Court issued a one paragraph, per curiam opinion affirming the
validity of Federal Baseball for the much broader proposition that “the busi-
ness of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs of profes-
sional baseball players was not within the scope of the federal antitrust
4 Karl Buscheck, Oakland A’s: Bud Selig Calls Coliseum a ‘Pit’ as ‘Perfect Storm’ Awaits,
BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1787591-oakland-as-
bud-selig-calls-coliseum-a-pit-as-perfect-storm-awaits.  The stadium encountered multiple
sewage leaks during the 2013 season, including one that flooded the team’s dugout in the
middle of a game. Id.
5 Susan Slusser, San Jose OKs Land Deal for Potential A’s Stadium, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 9,
2011), http://www.sfgate.com/sports/article/San-Jose-OKs-land-deal-for-potential-A-s-stadi
um-2323382.php.
6 A’s Seek Territorial Rights Resolution, ESPN (Mar. 7, 2012, 9:39 PM), http://espn.go
.com/mlb/story/_/id/7658699/oakland-athletics-san-francisco-giants-odds-territorial-
rights.
7 Complaint, City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 13-CV-02787
RMW (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2013).
8 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
9 Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).
10 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)).
11 Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208–09.
12 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
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laws.”13  The Court’s only support for that proposition was that Congress had
not passed legislation to overturn Federal Baseball, which indicated Congress’s
consent to the exemption.14
The Court directly addressed its judicially created baseball antitrust
exemption for the third and final time in Flood v. Kuhn.15  While the Court
noted that the exemption was “an exception and an anomaly,” the Court
concluded that baseball’s reliance on the exemption was a greater concern
that trumps any argument for overturning the exemption.16  Instead, the
Court reasoned that a change or repeal of the exemption should be made by
Congress.17  Without much analysis of congressional action, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had no intent to make any change to the exemption,
and thus Congress’s intent was for baseball to remain exempt from federal
antitrust laws.18
These three cases, now referred to as the “baseball trilogy,” have con-
founded courts and scholars for generations.  San Jose’s antitrust suit against
Major League Baseball renews the challenge of defining the scope and appli-
cability of the baseball antitrust exemption and the struggle to sort through
the lower court precedent to arrive at a workable standard for the exemp-
tion.  This Note will discuss the history of the exemption, the potential stan-
dards for applying the exemption, and analyze Judge Whyte’s order
dismissing San Jose’s antitrust claims in City of San Jose v. Office of the Commis-
sioner of Baseball19 to determine the persuasiveness the court’s opinion may
have going forward as well as potential issues with the court’s reasoning.20
13 Id. at 357.
14 See id. (“Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below are
affirmed on the authority of [Federal Baseball] so far as that decision determines that Con-
gress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal
antitrust laws.”).
15 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
16 Id. at 282.
17 Id. at 283 (“The Court has expressed concern about the confusion and the retroac-
tivity problems that inevitably would result with a judicial overturning of Federal Baseball.  It
has voiced a preference that if any change is to be made, it come by legislative action that,
by its nature, is only prospective in operation.”).
18 Id. at 284–86.
19 City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op.
at 2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion to
dismiss).
20 This Note will focus solely on the district court opinion dismissing the state and
federal antitrust claims.  On January 23, 2014, the City of San Jose filed a notice of appeal
to the Ninth Circuit.  Notice of Appeal of Plaintiffs, City of San Jose v. Office of the
Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2014).  The city’s motion to
expedite the case was granted on February 20, 2014, with briefing for the appeal scheduled
through the end of April 2014.  Order, City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Base-
ball, No. 14-15139 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2014) (order granting motion to expedite appeal).
Court updates regarding the city’s appeal can be found at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/
content/view.php?pk_id=0000000720.
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First, in Part I, this Note will chronicle the history behind the creation
and expansion of professional baseball’s antitrust exemption.  Part I will then
turn to a discussion of the Court’s rejection of efforts to apply the exemption
to other sports, followed by an introduction to the Curt Flood Act and its
change to the exemption.  Finally, Part I will introduce the most recent chal-
lenge to baseball’s antitrust exemption by the City of San Jose.
Next, Part II of this Note will detail the three main approaches to inter-
preting baseball’s antitrust exemption and will look at how the courts have
considered the effect, if any, of the Curt Flood Act in considering the exemp-
tion.  Part II will examine the three different approaches applied to base-
ball’s antitrust exemption: first, the narrow approach, which only prevents
challenges to baseball’s reserve clause; second, the “unique characteristics
and needs” approach; and third, the broad approach, which grants an all-
encompassing exemption.  Part II will conclude by looking at how courts
interpret the Curt Flood Act’s effect on the exemption.
Finally, Part III of this Note will analyze the City of San Jose’s and Major
League Baseball’s arguments regarding whether the exemption is limited to
only the reserve clause, as well as the San Jose court’s critique and ultimate
dismissal of that approach.  Then, Part III will discuss the San Jose court’s
consideration of the more narrow “unique characteristics and needs” stan-
dard, followed by a critique of the court’s support of a broad, all-encompass-
ing antitrust exemption.  Lastly, Part III will examine the arguments
regarding the effect of the Curt Flood Act, address the San Jose court’s con-
clusion that the Act demonstrates that Congress explicitly preserved a broad
exemption, and conclude with an analysis of the potential flaws with the
court’s conclusion.
I. PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND CITY OF SAN JOSE
V. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL
A. The Supreme Court’s Baseball Trilogy
Professional baseball’s historic antitrust exemption was born in 1922,
out of the Supreme Court opinion in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v.
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.21  The president of the Federal
League’s Baltimore Terrapins brought an antitrust suit against the American
League, the National League, the National Commission,22 and certain Fed-
eral League owners after the two leagues had bought out the owners of a
majority of the Federal League teams, leaving the Terrapins without any base-
21 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
22 The National Commission was created in 1903 to oversee organized baseball,
including interpreting and enforcing the National Agreement between the National
League and the American League. See The Commissionership: A Historical Perspective, MLB
.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/mlb_history_people.jsp?story=com (last visited
Mar. 8, 2014).
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ball league to call home.23  The Terrapins had refused the buyout offer the
other teams had accepted, because the team’s president was intent on having
a major league team in Baltimore, which was not provided for as part of the
buyout.24  Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Holmes reasoned that
the business of baseball—providing exhibitions of baseball between teams—
was a purely state affair and thus not a subject of interstate commerce.25
Because the leagues were not subject to interstate commerce, they were not
within the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act,26 and any conspiracy or
anticompetitive behavior engaged in by the leagues did not create a cause of
action under the Act.27  The Court also noted that the essential business of
baseball, the playing of the games themselves, was not trade within the mean-
ing of the Sherman Act because it is actually labor—the personal effort of the
players—and not manufacturing.28  On that reasoning, the Court affirmed
the D.C. Circuit’s judgment for the American League and the National
League.29
23 Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 207.  In 1914 the Federal League, created just a year earlier,
asked the National and American Leagues to allow it to participate as a member of the
National Agreement.  After the leagues rejected the Federal League’s request, the Federal
League began aggressively competing with the leagues by signing American and National
League players, building new stadiums, and bringing an antitrust suit against the leagues.
Edmund P. Edmonds, Over Forty Years in the On-Deck Circle: Congress and the Baseball Antitrust
Exemption, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 627, 630–31 (1994).  By the end of 1915, however, the
Federal League was incapable of keeping up the fight and entered an agreement with the
American and National Leagues under which the Federal League teams were bought out,
except the Baltimore Terrapins. Id. at 631.
24 See Michael W. Klein, Rose Is in Red, Black Sox Are Blue: A Comparison of Rose v. Gia-
matti and the 1921 Black Sox Trial, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 551, 558–59 (1991)
(noting that the Terrapins, seeking “[t]o counteract the folding of their team . . .
demanded the right to purchase the St. Louis Cardinals and to move the club to
Baltimore”).
25 Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208.
26 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)).  Sherman Act violations can be alleged as either a § 1 violation,
which prohibits specific anticompetitive conduct, 15 U.S.C. § 1, or a § 2 violation, which
prohibits end results that are anticompetitive in nature, id. § 2.  A § 1 violation requires
proof of (1) an agreement or conspiracy, (2) which unreasonably restrains trade, and (3)
which affects interstate commerce. Id. § 1.  A § 2 violation requires proof of “(1) the pos-
session of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power, as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”  United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
27 Fed. Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208–09.
28 Id. at 208–09 (“[T]he transport [of players across state lines] is a mere incident, not
the essential thing.  That to which it is incident, the exhibition, although made for money
would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words.  As
it is put by the defendants, personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of
commerce.”).
29 Id. at 209.
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Three decades later, the Supreme Court revisited its Federal Baseball
holding for the first time in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.30  In a one para-
graph, per curiam opinion, the Court held that Federal Baseball stood for the
proposition that “the business of providing public baseball games for profit
between clubs of professional baseball players was not within the scope of the
federal antitrust laws.”31  The Court affirmed the validity of that proposition
on the grounds that Congress had not passed legislation to overturn Federal
Baseball, which indicated Congress’s consent to the exemption.32  If baseball,
after having thirty years to develop with the understanding that the business
was not subject to antitrust laws, was to be subject to the antitrust laws then,
the Court declared, “it should be by legislation.”33
The Supreme Court over the next twenty years declined to extend Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson to other sports and entertainment industries.34
Then, in 1972, the Court directly addressed its judicially created baseball
antitrust exemption for the third and final time in Flood v. Kuhn.35  After
being traded from the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies, out-
fielder Curt Flood requested that he be made a free agent so that he could
sign a contract to play with a different team.36  When his request was denied,
he filed a federal antitrust suit against the Commissioner of Baseball, the
presidents of the two major leagues, and the twenty-four major league
clubs.37  Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun provided a detailed his-
tory of the game of baseball and the Court’s reasoning and holdings in Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson before affirming the validity of baseball’s antitrust
exemption based on the authority of Federal Baseball.38  Justice Blackmun
noted that the exemption was “an exception and an anomaly” that was “con-
fined to baseball” but, nevertheless, “the aberration [was] an established
one . . . that has been recognized . . . [in] a total of five consecutive cases” by
the Supreme Court.39  Baseball’s antitrust exemption, Justice Blackmun
wrote, “rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique charac-
30 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).
31 Id. at 357.
32 See id. (“Without re-examination of the underlying issues, the judgments below are
affirmed on the authority of [Federal Baseball] so far as that decision determines that Con-
gress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal
antitrust laws.”).
33 Id.
34 See infra Section I.B.
35 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
36 Id. at 265.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 285 (quoting the holding in Toolson that the judgment is affirmed on the
authority of Federal Baseball’s determination that Congress did not intend to include the
business of baseball within the scope of antitrust laws).
39 Id. at 282 (referencing the Court’s acceptance of baseball’s antitrust exemption in
Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922), Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam), United States v.
Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955), United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236
(1955), and Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)).
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teristics and needs.”40  The Court voiced its concern with overturning the
exemption, instead concluding that such a change should be made by Con-
gress, which had yet to have any “intention to subject baseball’s reserve sys-
tem to the reach of the antitrust statutes.”41
In a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Douglas argued that Fed-
eral Baseball was “a derelict in the stream of the law that [the Court], its crea-
tor, should remove.”42  Attacking the conclusion reached by the majority that
congressional inaction supports the continued affirmance of baseball’s anti-
trust exemption, Justice Douglas contended that if congressional inaction
was the appropriate standard then the Court “should rely upon the fact that
Congress has refused to enact bills broadly exempting professional sports
from antitrust regulation.”43  Having only granted professional sports one
statutory exemption from antitrust laws, for broadcasting rights,44 the Court
should “not ascribe a broader exemption through inaction than Congress
has seen fit to grant explicitly.”45  Interpreting congressional inaction in this
light, Justice Douglas concluded that “[t]he unbroken silence of Congress
should not prevent us from correcting our own mistakes.”46
Justice Marshall, in a dissent again joined by Justice Brennan, also took
issue with the majority’s interpretation of Congress’s inaction.  Justice Mar-
shall argued that it was incorrect to say that Congress had acquiesced to the
Court’s decisions in Federal Baseball and Toolson.47  Rather, because the Court
was inconsistent and isolated in distinguishing baseball from all other profes-
sional sports, Congress did not have to be as concerned with correcting the
judicially created exemption.48  The Court’s inconsistency also limited the
40 Id. at 282.
41 Id. at 283 (“The Court has expressed concern about the confusion and the retroac-
tivity problems that inevitably would result with a judicial overturning of Federal Baseball.  It
has voiced a preference that if any change is to be made, it come by legislative action that,
by its nature, is only prospective in operation.”).  Baseball’s reserve system was based
around a reserve clause in player contracts that obligated the player to only play for a
single team, regardless of the length of the contract they had signed with that team.  This
prevented players from changing teams without first being unconditionally released by the
team. See NEIL F. FLYNN, BASEBALL’S RESERVE SYSTEM 18–19 (2006).
42 Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 287.  Justice Douglas cited a committee report that had been authorized to
investigate various bills designed to grant a complete exemption of all professional sports
from federal antitrust laws. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-2002, at 1 (1952).  The relevant bills “were
introduced . . . by friends of baseball because they feared that the continued existence of
organized baseball as America’s national pastime was in substantial danger by the threat of
impending litigation.” Id.
44 See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (exempting the
National Football League, National Basketball Association, Major League Baseball, and
National Hockey League from federal antitrust laws for purposes of agreeing to national
television contracts).
45 Flood, 407 U.S. at 288 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
48 Id.
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power of Major League Baseball players to seek a change to the exemption
since “[w]hatever muscle they might have been able to muster by combining
forces with other athletes has been greatly impaired by the manner in which
[the] Court has isolated them.”49  Justice Marshall concluded that congres-
sional inaction did not justify the continuance of the exemption and that the
proper thing for the Court to do was to “admit our error and correct it.”50
Starting with a holding that the business of baseball was not subject to
the regulations of the Sherman Act because it was not part of interstate com-
merce and could not be considered “trade” within the meaning of the Act in
1922, professional baseball eventually came to be privileged with an exemp-
tion from federal antitrust laws by virtue of congressional inaction.  The path
to get there, however, left more questions than answers.  Along the way, the
nation’s other professional sports leagues would attempt to extend this privi-
leged exemption to their respective sports.
B. Applicability of Federal Baseball to Other Sports
While baseball was granted an exemption from federal antitrust laws, the
Court refused to extend the exemption to other professional sports leagues
and entertainment industries.  The first case came in 1955—United States v.
Shubert—where the Court declined to extend the exemption to theater com-
panies.51  The Court reasoned that Toolson was not necessarily an affirmance
of Federal Baseball as much as “a narrow application of the rule of stare deci-
sis.”52  The Court seemed to indicate, however, that the decision in Federal
Baseball was limited to “specifically fixing the status of the baseball business
under the antitrust laws and more particularly the validity of the so-called
‘reserve clause.’”53  That same year, in United States v. International Boxing
Club of New York, Inc.,54 a companion case to Shubert, the Court also refused to
extend the baseball exemption to professional boxing.
The Court continued its narrow reading of Federal Baseball and Toolson
and elected not to extend the antitrust exemption to the other professional
sports leagues.  In Radovich v. National Football League55 the Court held that,
while acknowledging that such a decision may be “unrealistic, inconsistent,
49 Id.
50 Id. at 292–93 (“We do not lightly overrule our prior constructions of federal stat-
utes, but when our errors deny substantial federal rights, like the right to compete freely
and effectively to the best of one’s ability as guaranteed by the antitrust laws, we must admit
our error and correct it.  We have done so before and we should do so again here.”).
51 United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228 (1955) (reasoning that Federal Baseball
applied only to “the business of baseball and nothing else”).
52 Id. at 230.
53 Id. at 229.  It is important to note, however, that there is some question as to the
importance of the reserve clause in Federal Baseball. See discussion infra Sections II.A, III.A.
54 United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955) (holding
that the baseball exemption is not applicable to other types of local performance
exhibitions).
55 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
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or illogical,” the “interstate business involved in organized professional foot-
ball places it within the provisions” of the Sherman Act, even if baseball was
exempt from the Act.56  In his dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that
whether the business of football, baseball, or any other enterprise was bound
by federal antitrust laws was “a question for judicial determination” and
emphasized that “full respect for stare decisis does not require a judge to
forego his own convictions” once his colleagues have decided a judicial ques-
tion differently.57
The Court also declined to apply the antitrust exemption to conduct of
professional basketball in 1971 in Haywood v. National Basketball Association.58
However, the Court again seemed to interpret baseball’s exemption as lim-
ited to the reserve clause.59  While the lack of exemption for basketball was
noted without much reason or analysis, it was the last major professional
sports league to receive consideration on the issue and it is possible that the
Court by this point thought the holdings in Shubert, International Boxing, and
Radovich had made the point explicitly clear that the baseball antitrust
exemption only applied to baseball.
Consequently, in the twenty years following Toolson, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed baseball’s antitrust exemption in the course of denying other
groups and professional sports leagues similar exemptions.  The affirmance
was not ironclad, however, as the Court’s language in its various opinions left
room to argue that the exemption was limited to baseball’s reserve clause.
C. Curt Flood Act of 1998
In 1998, Congress finally responded to the Supreme Court-created base-
ball exemption.  However, it was the lobbying of Major League Baseball and
the Major League Baseball Players’ Association following the 1997 Collective
Bargaining Agreement, not congressional concern with the exemption,
which prompted congressional action.60  Named in honor of Curt Flood for
56 Id. at 452.
57 Id. at 455 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
58 Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (“Basketball . . . does
not enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws.”).
59 Id. (noting that the decision involved in the suit “would be similar to the one on
baseball’s reserve clause which our decisions exempting baseball from the antitrust laws have
foreclosed” (emphasis added)).
60 See Edmund P. Edmonds, The Curt Flood Act of 1998: A Congressional Response to Base-
ball’s Antitrust Exemption, in 1 BASEBALL AND ANTITRUST: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CURT FLOOD ACT OF 1998, at 1, 3 (Edmund P. Edmonds & William H. Manz eds., 2001)
[hereinafter BASEBALL AND ANTITRUST] (noting that the legislation was a result of the “joint
agreement between Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion embodied in their most recent collective bargaining agreement to appeal to Congress
for a legislative change” to bring the players within the protection of federal antitrust laws);
John T. Wolohan, The Curt Flood Act of 1998 and Major League Baseball’s Federal Antitrust
Exemption, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 347, 367 (1999) (“[A]s part of the 1997 Basic Agreement
between MLB and the MLBPA both sides agreed that they would jointly request and lobby
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his efforts challenging baseball’s reserve clause in Flood v. Kuhn,61 the Curt
Flood Act of 1998 explicitly granted baseball players the same antitrust rights
that basketball and football players enjoyed.62  The Act’s goal was to level the
playing field between the team owners and the players, as well as help inject
stability into baseball’s labor relations, which had suffered through numer-
ous work stoppages since the formation of the Major League Baseball Play-
ers’ Association.63
In an effort to accomplish this narrow goal, the Act specifically removed
baseball’s antitrust exemption only in regards to major league players.  The
exemption was to remain in effect in any other context.  Congress made this
explicitly clear in stating that the purpose of the Act was not to “change the
application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with respect to any
other person or entity.”64  The Act specifically identified six categories that
would remain subject to the existing jurisprudence concerning the exemp-
tion: (1) minor league baseball players; (2) organized minor league baseball;
(3) “franchise expansion, location or relocation, [and] franchise ownership
issues;” (4) conduct and agreements related to the Sports Broadcasting Act
of 1961; (5) umpires and other employees of organized professional baseball;
and (6) any conduct or agreements with persons not in the business of Major
League Baseball.65
D. City of San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball
The most recent challenge to the baseball antitrust exemption arises out
of the efforts of the City of San Jose to build a new baseball stadium for the
Oakland Athletics.  In return, the team agreed to move thirty-five miles south
of Oakland to San Jose and become the San Jose Athletics.66  In November of
2011, the San Jose City Council executed an option agreement with the Ath-
letics Investment Group, which gave the team a two-year option to purchase
land owned by the city to build a new stadium.67  However, the team has
been prevented from taking further action by Major League Baseball.  Specif-
ically, the San Francisco Giants have objected to the possible move on the
grounds that the league’s bylaws grant the Giants exclusive territorial rights
to San Jose and the surrounding area of Santa Clara County.68  Since 2009, a
for the passage of a law clarifying that professional baseball players are covered under
antitrust law.  The result of this joint effort is the Curt Flood Act.”).
61 See Edmonds, supra note 60, at 1–2.
62 Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012).
63 See Wolohan, supra note 60, at 348.
64 15 U.S.C. § 26b.
65 See id. § 26b(b)(1)–(6).
66 Slusser, supra note 5.
67 Id.
68 Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–26.  The history of the Bay Area territory rights is an
interesting side story of the case.  Originally, Santa Clara County, where San Jose is located,
was part of neither the Giants’ nor the Athletics’ territorial rights.  Ken Belson, In Tug of
War over San Jose, A’s and the Giants Remain at a Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at D5.  In
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special Relocation Committee has been tasked with evaluating the territorial
claims by each of the Bay Area teams, though no public recommendations
have been made by the committee and Major League Baseball’s official
stance has been that the committee “is still at work.”69
After years of waiting, on June 18, 2013, the City of San Jose decided to
file a lawsuit against Major League Baseball for tortious interference and vio-
lation of state and federal antitrust laws.70  The city alleged that Major
League Baseball interfered with and was actively preventing the fulfillment of
the city’s option agreement with the Athletics by preventing the team from
relocating to San Jose and that Major League Baseball was an “unreasonable
and unlawful monopoly” which excluded San Jose from competing with
other cities for a Major League Baseball franchise.71  As a result, the city
alleged it was deprived of between $2.9 billion and $4.1 billion in total new
economic output related to the relocation of the Athletics, including indirect
spending on the stadium, new tax revenue, and spending by fans and
businesses.72
Major League Baseball promptly filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit,
asserting that the possible relocation of a team falls squarely within the core
of baseball’s antitrust exemption.73  As such, Major League Baseball argued
that the city’s antitrust claims under both federal and state antitrust law were
barred.74  Alternatively, Major League Baseball argued that the city’s claim
failed as a matter of law and warranted dismissal because the city could not
establish any “unfair” or “wrongful act,” either of which would be required to
establish its claims absent a violation of the Sherman Act, from which base-
ball is exempted.75  Major League Baseball also stated that the city’s contract
1990 the owner of the Giants, Bob Lurie, was considering moving the team to Florida. Id.
In an effort to help keep the Giants in the Bay Area, the Athletics’ then-owner, Walter
Haas, gave consent for the Giants to relocate to San Jose. Id.  The Athletics claim that the
agreement was contingent on the Giants obtaining a publicly funded stadium in San Jose;
but when that failed to materialize, the Giants continued to claim the territorial rights to
Santa Clara County anyway. Id.
69 A’s Seek Territorial Rights Resolution, ESPN (Mar. 7, 2012, 9:39 PM), http://espn.go
.com/mlb/story/_/id/7658699/oakland-athletics-san-francisco-giants-odds-territorial-
rights (quoting Major League Baseball spokesperson Pat Courtney).
70 Complaint, supra note 7, at 34–41.
71 Id. at 28–29.
72 Id. at 31–33 (pleading that the new stadium would create $1.8 billion in direct
spending, $1.5 million per year in new tax revenue for the city’s General Fund, $3.5 mil-
lion per year in new property tax revenue, at least $31.2 million in new sales tax revenue,
and “that the net present value of the total net new economic output generated by the
spending related to the operations of the ballpark would be approximately $2.9 billion
over a thirty-year period and $4.1 billion over a fifty-year period”).
73 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) at 8, City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-
02787 RMW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss].
74 Id. at 5.
75 Id. at 11.
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claims must be dismissed because the city had not—and could not—establish
the essential elements of “damage” or “breach.”76
Judge Ronald Whyte granted Major League Baseball’s motion to dismiss
the city’s antitrust claims on October 11, 2013, but recognized serious flaws
in the antitrust exemption for baseball.77  The court ruled that the city’s state
law tort claims were sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.78  The court
noted that the exemption was “an ‘aberration’ that makes little sense”79 but
recognized that the Supreme Court’s holdings remain unchanged and pro-
vide a federal antitrust exemption for the business of baseball.80  The case
provides the most recent decision concerning the scope and applicability of
an antitrust exemption for professional baseball, and like the cases that have
come before it, the opinion leaves many important questions unanswered
and fails to articulate a workable standard for future cases.
The Northern District of California’s opinion confronts many of the
questions about the scope and applicability of professional baseball’s anti-
trust exemption that courts and scholars have debated since Flood and the
Curt Flood Act.  Specifically, what conduct or situations does the antitrust
exemption apply to?  What is the appropriate standard for applying the
exemption to such cases?  And what effect does the enactment of the Curt
Flood Act have on the scope of the antitrust exemption?  Part II of this Note
will analyze the potential answers to these questions that lower courts have
accepted and advanced.
II. WHAT TO MAKE OF ALL OF THIS?  COURTS, SCHOLARS STRUGGLE TO
DEFINE “THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL” AND THE PROPER SCOPE OF
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
As encountered again in the recent San Jose challenge, the scope and
application of Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption continues to frus-
trate courts and parties more than ninety years after it was first created in
Federal Baseball.  This has resulted in various approaches being taken by
courts across the country.  The City of San Jose argued that the exemption
was limited to the reserve clause alone, a position that was most notably
76 Id.
77 City of San Jose, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op. at 2 (granting in part and denying in
part defendants’ motion to dismiss).
78 Id. at 4.  Judge Whyte requested the parties provide the court with briefs on whether
the state law claims should be dismissed as well.  Order Setting Initial Case Management
Conference, City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013).  After considering the issue in greater depth, Judge Whyte
elected to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law tort claims and dismissed
the case without prejudice.  Judgment, City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball,
No. C-13-02787 RMW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2014) (ordering judgment in favor of Office of the
Commissioner of Baseball).
79 City of San Jose, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op. at 15 (quoting Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S.
258, 282 (1972)).
80 Id. at 17.
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adopted in Piazza v. Major League Baseball.81  Major League Baseball coun-
tered with an argument for a broad, all-encompassing exemption under
which all aspects of the “business of baseball,” including league structure and
franchise location, are exempt from antitrust law challenges.82  The court,
while explicitly not endorsing a more narrow “unique characteristics and
needs” standard that has been advanced by other courts, considered that
standard as a middle ground under which San Jose would still fail on the
reasoning that franchise relocation efforts are integral to the business of
baseball.83
This Part will detail the three main approaches to interpreting the
breadth and application of professional baseball’s antitrust exemption and
will look at how the courts have considered the effect, if any, of the Curt
Flood Act in analyzing the exemption.  This Part will first address the case law
that advances the argument that the exemption is limited and only prevents
challenges to baseball’s reserve clause.  Second, this Part will analyze the
“unique characteristics and needs” standard followed by other courts.  Third,
the argument that the exemption is broad and all-encompassing will be con-
sidered.  Finally, this Part will conclude by looking at how the Curt Flood Act
affects the exemption.
A. Limiting the Exemption to Only the Reserve Clause
The most thorough district court analysis considering the scope of the
baseball exemption came in Piazza v. Major League Baseball.84  The case arose
as a result of an investment group’s failed attempt to purchase the San Fran-
cisco Giants and relocate the team to Tampa Bay, Florida.85  When Major
League Baseball rejected the sale to the group, the team was instead sold to
another investment group, for $15 million less.86  Vincent Piazza and Vincent
Tirendi, the leaders of the investment group seeking to move the team to
Tampa Bay, then sued Major League Baseball for violating federal antitrust
laws.87  Specifically, they argued that Major League Baseball had “monopo-
lized the market” for teams by placing “direct and indirect restraints on the
purchase, sale, transfer, relocation of, and competition for” teams.88  The
court denied a motion by Major League Baseball to dismiss the antitrust
claims based on baseball’s antitrust exemption.  The court reasoned that
Flood had invalidated the rule of Federal Baseball and Toolson and that the
business of baseball was not interstate commerce and thus not subject to the
Sherman Act.  From this the court concluded that the only precedential
81 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
82 Id. at 435.
83 City of San Jose, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op. at 13, 17 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
84 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436–41.
85 Id. at 421–22.
86 Id. at 423.
87 Id. at 423–24.
88 Id. at 424.
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value remaining was based on the facts involved in Flood: the exemption of
baseball’s reserve system from federal antitrust laws.89
The Piazza court’s reasoning was found to be persuasive by courts in two
ensuing cases.  In Butterworth v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
the Florida Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether baseball’s
antitrust exemption limited the Florida Attorney General’s ability to conduct
an antitrust investigation into the failed purchase of the San Francisco Giants
by Vincent Piazza’s investment group.90  The court concluded that “[b]ased
upon the language and the findings in Flood . . . baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion extends only to the reserve system.”91
Similarly, in Morsani v. Major League Baseball, another group of investors
brought a suit against Major League Baseball for violating federal antitrust
laws after their attempted purchase and relocation of two teams, first the
Minnesota Twins in 1984 followed by the Texas Rangers in 1988, were each
blocked by Major League Baseball.92  In concluding that baseball’s antitrust
exemption was limited to the reserve clause, the court cited the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision in Butterworth as binding authority.93
The Piazza holding’s persuasiveness was essentially limited to just a sin-
gle case since Morsani merely followed Butterworth as binding authority.  The
reasoning received some praise from academia as well, but it has generally
been rejected as flawed and unpersuasive.94
B. The “Unique Characteristics and Needs” Standard
A more narrow standard for interpreting the scope of professional base-
ball’s antitrust exemption is commonly referred to as the “unique characteris-
tics and needs” standard.  The standard is commonly credited to two district
court opinions, Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass’n95 and Pos-
tema v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,96 both of which rejected
the application of the baseball exemption to situations involving non-baseball
enterprises and employment relations with umpires.
In Henderson Broadcasting, the court reasoned that the baseball exemp-
tion was narrow in scope and its application was limited to conduct that was
“central enough to the unique characteristics and needs of baseball” to be a
part of the sport, comparable to how central the “players, umpires, the
89 Id. at 438.
90 Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1021–23 (Fla.
1994).
91 Id. at 1025.
92 Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 663 So. 2d 653, 655–56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
93 Id. at 657.
94 See Nathaniel Grow, Defining the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework for Deter-
mining the Scope of Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 589
(2010) (concluding that, while Piazza “has generated a split of opinion among scholars,” it
ultimately should be rejected).
95 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
96 799 F. Supp. 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
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league structure and the reserve system are.”97  The case involved a Houston
radio station’s challenge to the Houston Astros’ decision to cancel the sta-
tion’s broadcasting agreement for Astros’ games and enter into an agree-
ment with a competing radio station that granted that station exclusive rights
to broadcast the team’s games.98  The court stated that “[t]he focus of the
court in an antitrust action is the particular activity and the particular market
in question.”99  In reconciling baseball’s antitrust exemption with the anti-
trust laws (which favor competition), the key distinction for the court was
that the broadcasting agreement at issue in the case involved “a distinct and
separate industry” from baseball.100  The court concluded that “[t]he base-
ball exemption today is an anachronism” that should not be extended to a
context outside of the unique characteristics and needs of the game without
reason.101
In Postema, the court framed the key question in baseball antitrust
exemption cases as whether the conduct or actions in question were “central
enough to baseball to be encompassed in the baseball exemption.”102  The
case was initiated by a female former umpire who alleged that her termina-
tion constituted employment discrimination and a violation of antitrust
laws.103  In analyzing the applicability of baseball’s antitrust exemption to the
termination of an umpire, the court concluded that because the Supreme
Court’s baseball trilogy only “considered the baseball exemption in very lim-
ited contexts, i.e. with regard to baseball’s reserve clause and to its league
structure,” the Court’s opinions on the breadth of exemption do not deter-
mine whether the exemption applies outside of league structure and player
relations.104  The court reasoned that the Flood Court’s statement that the
exemption “rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique
characteristics and needs”105 indicated that “baseball might not be exempt
from liability for conduct not touching on those characteristics or needs.”106
Applying that standard, the court held that the baseball exemption did not
extend to umpires because “[u]nlike the league structure or the reserve sys-
tem, baseball’s relations with non-players are not a unique characteristic or
need of the game.”107
While the two courts adopted a “unique characteristics and needs” stan-
dard, they were not uniform in the parameters and application of the stan-
97 Henderson Broad., 541 F. Supp. at 268–69 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98 Id. at 264.
99 Id. at 271.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 271–72.
102 Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1489 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (quoting Henderson Broad., 541 F. Supp. at 265), rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60
(2d Cir. 1993).
103 Id. at 1479–80.
104 Id. at 1488.
105 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
106 Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1488.
107 Id. at 1489.
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dard.  The Postema opinion specifically held that baseball umpires are not
under the exemption.108  The Henderson Broadcasting opinion, however, rea-
soned that “[r]adio broadcasting is not a part of the sport in the way in which
players, umpires, the league structure and the reserve system are.”109  While it
may be argued that the reference to umpires in Henderson Broadcasting is
merely dicta, the conflicting interpretations of the “unique characteristics
and needs” standard may add weight to an argument that the standard lacks
credibility.110
C. Broad, All-Encompassing Exemption
Exactly how far the exemption extends is far from clear.  Major League
Baseball, as one might expect, contends that baseball’s exemption is broad
and encompasses all aspects of the business of baseball.111  However, an argu-
ment for a narrower interpretation finds support in antitrust jurisprudence
outside of the sports context, where exemptions from antitrust laws are gen-
erally construed narrowly.112  The question left unsolved by the Supreme
Court’s baseball trilogy is how to balance the narrow interpretation canon
with the broad language in the Court’s opinions on baseball’s antitrust
exemption.
The Seventh Circuit considered the issue for the first time after the
Supreme Court’s Flood opinion in Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn.113  The
case involved the efforts of the then-owner of the Oakland Athletics, Charles
Finley, to sell the contract rights of three of the team’s pitchers to the Boston
Red Sox and the New York Yankees for $3.5 million.114  The Commissioner
of Major League Baseball, Bowie Kuhn, rejected the deal on the grounds that
it was inconsistent with the best interests of the league.115  Finley countered
by suing the Commissioner for violation of federal antitrust laws and six
other counts.116  With respect to baseball’s antitrust exemption, Finley
argued on appeal that the exemption applied only to the reserve system.117
108 Id.
109 Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 269 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (emphasis added).
110 For a brief argument on why the “unique characteristics and needs” standard may
be flawed, see generally Grow, supra note 94, at 600–01 (arguing that the Court did not
“intend[ ] to place a new limitation upon the exemption with the inclusion of this
passage”).
111 Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) at 2, City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 13-
CV-02787 RMW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Defendants’ Reply] (arguing that
Supreme Court precedent has established “the broad scope of the exemption”).
112 See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982) (“[E]xemptions
from the antitrust laws must be construed narrowly.”).
113 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
114 See id. at 531.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 540.
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The court disagreed and instead concluded that it was clear, based on Federal
Baseball, Toolson, Flood, and Radovich, that the Supreme Court “intended to
exempt the business of baseball, not any particular facet of that business,
from the federal antitrust laws.”118
Similarly, in McCoy v. Major League Baseball, a Washington district court
confronted the issue of how broadly the business of baseball was to be inter-
preted.119  There, the fans and businesses that operated near major league
stadiums brought a suit against Major League Baseball (which consisted of
the twenty-eight major league teams, the American League, the National
League, and the Commissioner of Baseball), alleging that the league violated
antitrust and labor laws in failing to agree on a new collective bargaining
agreement with the Major League Baseball Players’ Association during the
1994 baseball season.120  As a result of the failure to reach a new labor agree-
ment, the players went on strike and the remainder of the season was can-
celled, as well as the 1994 World Series and a portion of the 1995 baseball
season.121  The court presented the initial question as “whether the antitrust
exemption is applicable to the business of baseball.”122  The court concluded
that the scope of the exemption was “[t]he business of providing public base-
ball games for profit between clubs of professional baseball players.”123
The problem with the interpretation that the exemption applies broadly
to the business of baseball is that the issue turns to defining what exactly the
business of baseball is.  The interpretation is not a meaningful standard that
courts can apply.  Rather, it just shifts the debate.  Or worse, courts may end
up dismissing antitrust claims against professional baseball without actually
118 Id. at 541.  The court did recognize that there was some limit to the exemption in a
footnote, where the court “recognize[d] that [the] exemption does not apply wholesale to
all cases which may have some attenuated relation to the business of baseball.” Id. at n.51.
The court cited Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 365 F. Supp. 235 (N.D.
Cal. 1972), rev’d, 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975), for this proposition.  Interestingly, San
Jose relied on the final court opinion in that litigation for the argument that the exemp-
tion did not apply to all cases having anything to do with baseball.  City of San Jose v. Office
of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op. at 13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013).
The court rejected the argument that the case supported the argument. Id.  Part of the
confusion over the relevance of the case may stem from the fact that the antitrust claims in
the case were raised by the owner of a team against a plaintiff-concession company. Twin
City Sportservice, 365 F. Supp. at 238.  Because baseball holds the exemption, it obviously has
no effect on the validity of another party’s anticompetitive conduct.  This seems to indicate
that—assuming the court in Finley did not misunderstand the facts of the case—the court’s
meaning of “attenuated” is cases in which the alleged antitrust violations were not commit-
ted by a professional baseball-related party.
119 911 F. Supp. 454, 458 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
120 Id. at 455.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 456.
123 Id. at 457 (alteration in original) (quoting Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356, 357 (1953) (per curiam)).
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applying any standard or analysis at all.  That would be tantamount to Major
League Baseball having an antitrust exclusion, not merely an exemption.124
D. Effect of the Curt Flood Act of 1998
The Curt Flood Act clearly removed baseball’s antitrust exemption in
regard to players, but the effect of the Act in demonstrating congressional
intent has been less than clear.  The stated purpose of the Act was not to
“change the application of the antitrust laws in any other context or with
respect to any other person or entity.”125  The question has lingered whether
this language is to be interpreted as Congress intending to afford complete
antitrust protection to all conduct outside of player relations or, alternatively,
as Congress remaining silent on the issue, leaving the competing lower court
opinions as persuasive authority.  Each option has been backed by various
courts and academics.126
The argument that the Act is agnostic regarding the scope of the exemp-
tion is supported by the specific text of the Act, which states that courts
should not interpret the Act “as a basis for changing the application of the
antitrust laws”127 as well as the legislative history of the Act.128  The argument
that Congress actually meant to reinforce the business of baseball aspect of
the antitrust exemption is premised on the fact that the courts had consist-
ently interpreted the exemption that way.  Thus, in stating that the Act “does
not change the application of the antitrust laws” outside of covering Major
League Baseball players under the federal antitrust laws,129 Congress was
solidifying the most common application of the antitrust exemption.
124 See, e.g., Joseph J. McMahon, Jr. & John P. Rossi, A History and Analysis of Baseball’s
Three Antitrust Exemptions, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 213, 243 (1995) (“[Courts have] failed
to recognize the difference between an antitrust exclusion and an antitrust exemption.  As
a result, the scope of baseball’s antitrust exemption has become whatever the reviewing
court says it is.”).
125 Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(d) (2012).
126 Compare Grow, supra note 94, at 576 (noting that “[w]hile some might read Section
B of the [Curt Flood Act] as congressional endorsement of a broad antitrust exemption . . .
in reality the statute remains agnostic regarding the remaining scope of the exemption”
and should thus be read as “not implicat[ing] the scope of baseball’s antitrust exemp-
tion . . . aside from the fact that it permits antitrust suits to be filed by current major league
players”), with Wolohan, supra note 60, at 377 (arguing that “Congress[,] . . . by failing to
include the entire business of baseball in the Curt Flood Act, wanted everything not having
to do with player relations exempt from antitrust laws”).
127 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b).
128 Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform: Hearing on S. 53 Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. 1 (1997) (opening statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm.
on the Judiciary) (“Clarifying that antitrust laws apply to Major League Baseball is some-
thing that will benefit sports fans across the country . . . . Making it clear . . . that the
antitrust laws apply to Major League Baseball . . . will not only put baseball on a level
playing field with the other professional sports, but will also put the owners on a more level
playing field with the players, and will thereby bring stability to labor relations in this
area.”).
129 15 U.S.C. § 26b.
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In Morsani v. Major League Baseball, a Florida district court addressed the
effect of the Curt Flood Act on Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption
outside of the player-labor context.130  The court concluded that in passing
the Curt Flood Act, Congress preserved “the broadest aspects of the antitrust
exemption” by “explicitly preserv[ing] the exemption for all matters ‘relating
to or affecting franchise expansion, location or relocation, franchise owner-
ship issues, including ownership transfers.’”131  The court’s conclusion has
not been universally accepted, however.
In Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, another Florida district court con-
sidered the effect of the Act and came to a contrary result.132  Major League
Baseball, just as it did in its litigation with San Jose,133 asserted that the Act
“constitut[ed] an endorsement by Congress of the exemption of the business
of baseball.”134  Noting that Congress made clear that the Act was “not to
affect issues other than direct employment matters,” the court concluded
that the proper interpretation of the Act is that it should not have any effect
on whether the exemption applies to the case before the court.135
Just as legal scholars have split on the effect of the Curt Flood Act, so too
have the courts, even within the same state.  With potentially persuasive
authority for any number of standards for discerning the scope of Major
League Baseball’s antitrust exemption, Judge Whyte attempted to sort
through options in deciding on Major League Baseball’s motion to dismiss
the most recent challenge to its privileged antitrust exemption.
III. THE PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY OF SAN JOSE V. OFFICE OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL AND WHAT THE CASE MEANS
FOR BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
As encountered again in San Jose’s challenge of baseball’s conduct
under state and federal antitrust laws, the scope and application of Major
League Baseball’s antitrust exemption continues to frustrate courts and par-
ties more than ninety years after it was first fashioned in the now infamous
and hotly contested Federal Baseball opinion.  This has resulted in various
approaches being taken by courts across the country.136  In this most recent
challenge to the exemption, the City of San Jose argued that the exemption
was limited to only the reserve clause, a position which was most notably
adopted in Piazza v. Major League Baseball.137  Major League Baseball coun-
tered with an argument for a broad, all-encompassing exemption that would
shield all aspects of the business of baseball from antitrust claims, including
130 79 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
131 Id. at 1335 n.12 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(3)).
132 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1331 & n.16 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
133 See Defendants’ Reply, supra note 111, at 2 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent
has established “the broad scope of the exemption”).
134 Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1331 n.16.
135 Id.
136 See supra Sections II.A–C.
137 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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league structure and franchise location.138  The court, while not sanctioning
a tapered “unique characteristics and needs” standard that has been
advanced by other courts, considered that standard as a middle ground
under which San Jose would still fail on the reasoning that franchise reloca-
tion efforts are integral to the business of baseball.139
The Northern District of California opinion in City of San Jose v. Office of
the Commissioner of Baseball provides yet another attempt to tackle the issue of
the scope and applicability of the antitrust exemption of professional base-
ball.  This Part will first analyze the parties’ arguments on the exemption
being limited to only the reserve clause as well as the court’s critique and
ultimate dismissal of the Piazza court’s conclusion that the exemption is lim-
ited to only the reserve clause.  Next, this Part will explore the court’s consid-
eration of the more narrow “unique characteristics and needs” standard.
The court’s reflection on Major League Baseball’s argument for a broad, all-
encompassing antitrust exemption will be critiqued.  Finally, this Part will
examine the respective parties’ arguments in relation to the effect of the
Curt Flood Act, explore the court’s conclusion that the Act demonstrates that
Congress explicitly preserved a broad interpretation of the exemption, and
discuss the potential flaws with that conclusion.
A. Limiting the Exemption to Only the Reserve Clause Lacks Persuasive Appeal
In Piazza v. Major League Baseball, the court concluded that professional
baseball’s antitrust exemption was limited to baseball’s reserve system and
that this was the only context under which the federal antitrust laws did not
apply to baseball.140  San Jose argued that the factors the court relied on in
Piazza offered strong reasons for the court to likewise narrowly construe the
baseball exemption, specifically that: (1) the exemption was judicially created
and as such it should be narrowly construed, (2) the reasoning for the
exemption had been overturned in Flood, (3) the Supreme Court’s applica-
tion of the exemption had been limited to labor issues, and (4) no other
professional sport is exempt from antitrust laws.141  This interpretation is fur-
ther supported by the explicit reasoning in Flood, where the Court noted that
“[w]ith its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal antitrust laws,
baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception and an anomaly.”142
138 Defendants’ Reply, supra note 111, at 2.
139 City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op.
at 17 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants’
motion to dismiss).
140 Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438; see supra Section II.A.
141 Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) at
4, City of San Jose, No. 13-CV-02787 RMW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Memoran-
dum in Opposition].
142 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (emphasis added).
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Counter to this, Major League Baseball argued that Piazza was a “widely
criticized” opinion that has been summarily rejected.143  The fundamental
flaw in the Piazza court’s reasoning, Major League Baseball contended, was
that the court incorrectly believed Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood had only
dealt with baseball’s reserve clause.144  In reality, those cases actually involved
monopolization and restraint of competition allegations, claims broader than
merely the reserve clause.145
In the motion to dismiss the antitrust claims, Judge Whyte sided with
Major League Baseball’s argument and openly “disagree[d] with the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania’s opinion in Piazza that Federal Baseball, Toolson and
Flood can be limited to the reserve clause.”146  Judge Whyte refuted the argu-
ment for limiting baseball’s exemption to the reserve clause by concluding
that “Federal Baseball and Toolson are broadly decided” and “not limited to the
reserve clause either by the underlying facts . . . or the language used in the
holdings.”147  Looking to the text of those opinions, the court reasoned that
the exemption cannot be limited to the reserve clause because the Court
never referenced the reserve clause in Federal Baseball or Toolson, and the
Court’s reference to the reserve clause in Flood was due to it being the only
alleged conduct that violated antitrust laws.148
The court’s holding rejecting Piazza finds additional support among
scholars who have likewise noted that Piazza misinterpreted Federal Baseball,
Toolson, and Flood.149  The Northern District of California joins several fed-
eral and state courts that have also rejected Piazza.150 New Orleans Pelicans
Baseball, Inc. v. National Ass’n of Professional Baseball Leagues151 provides an
illustrative example.  There, two minor league teams, the AAA Denver
Zephyrs and the AA Charlotte Knights, both attempted to relocate to New
Orleans.152  Under the league rules governing Minor League Baseball, a
higher classification team has priority over a lower classification team in cases
143 Defendants’ Reply, supra note 111, at 4.
144 Id. at 5.
145 Id.
146 City of San Jose, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op. at 15–16 (order granting in part and
denying in part defendants’ motion to dismiss).
147 Id. at 15.
148 Id. at 16.
149 See, e.g., Grow, supra note 94, at 592–99 (noting that in Flood the reserve clause was
the only anticompetitive restraint on trade that was being challenged and that Federal Base-
ball and Toolson never mentioned the reserve clause); Thomas J. Ostertag, Baseball’s Anti-
trust Exemption: Its History and Continuing Importance, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 54, 62–63
(2004) (arguing that Piazza is mistaken because Federal Baseball dealt with more than the
reserve clause and that if Flood was intended to overrule or narrow Federal Baseball or Tool-
son, then it would have made some reference to such a conclusion, which it failed to do).
150 See, e.g., Minn. Twins P’ship v. State, 592 N.W.2d 847, 855–56 (Minn. 1999) (con-
cluding that Piazza’s reasoning was faulty and rejecting it); McCoy v. Major League Base-
ball, 911 F. Supp. 454, 457 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (same).
151 No. 73-253, 1994 WL 631144 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 1994).
152 Id. at *1.
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of such conflict.153  The plaintiffs argued that Piazza should control on a
summary judgment motion; the court, however, concluded that “[a]lthough
Piazza presents an impressive dissent from precedent, this Court associates
itself with the weight of authority.”154  Judge Whyte echoed that conclusion
and, as a result, provided support for the contention that it is unlikely courts
will find Piazza persuasive going forward.
Future challengers to baseball’s antitrust exemption would be well
advised to advance more compelling arguments for a narrow interpretation
of the exemption.  Not only has relying on Piazza been a losing argument in
virtually every case in which it has been advanced, it has the potential to
frame the issue as whether or not Piazza is the controlling precedent or,
more broadly, whether or not baseball’s exemption was limited to the reserve
clause by Flood.  Framed in that context, challengers of the antitrust exemp-
tion will nearly always lose, based on the overwhelming rejection of Piazza
and its faulty reasoning.  This is precisely what happened to the City of San
Jose, where Judge Whyte during oral argument indicated that the case could
turn entirely on whether Piazza is the binding authority.155
Challengers to baseball’s antitrust exemption may be more successful by
advancing an argument for a strict reading and narrow application of the
Supreme Court’s baseball trilogy.  A court could apply the exemption to only
the contexts contemplated in Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood, namely a
league’s decision not to allow a team from a rival league to join its ranks156
and challenges to the league’s labor structure.157  Such an approach would
avoid one of the principal criticisms of the Piazza court’s reasoning: that Fed-
eral Baseball and Toolson were not solely challenges to baseball’s reserve
clause.  This approach also comports with the results reached in several other
cases in which lower courts have held that baseball’s antitrust exemption was
inapplicable.  For example, the Texas district court’s holding in Henderson
that media broadcasting agreements are outside of the exemption,158 the
New York district court’s conclusion in Postema that relations between base-
ball and umpires are outside of the exemption,159 the Florida Supreme
153 Id. at *5.
154 Id. at *8.
155 Transcript of Proceedings Before the Honorable Ronald M. Whyte United States
District Judge at 10, City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 13-CV-02787
RMW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (discussing Piazza with Judge Whyte interjecting that it was
clear “that if you follow Piazza . . . [San Jose] win[s]”).
156 Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 207–08 (1922).
157 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356, 356 (1953) (per curiam); see also Grow, supra note 94, at 569 (noting that “Toolson
[had] refused to accept his assignment” to the Yankees’ minor league affiliate and filed his
antitrust suit alleging that “the reserve clause constituted an illegal restraint of trade”).
158 Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 268–69 (S.D. Tex.
1982).
159 Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1489 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
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Court’s holding in Butterworth that baseball’s exemption does not extend to
the transfer of a baseball franchise,160 and, most famously, the Pennsylvania
district court’s conclusion in Piazza that approval or rejection of the sale of a
team is not within the bounds of the exemption.161
The Piazza court’s argument that baseball’s antitrust exemption is lim-
ited to only the reserve clause went much further than this approach envi-
sions.  The court in Piazza concluded that Flood had invalidated the “rule” of
Federal Baseball and Toolson, and thus only lower courts were bound by the
results of those cases, which the court believed to be that the reserve clause
was exempt from the federal antitrust laws.162  Instead, this approach accepts
that the “rule” of Federal Baseball and Toolson is not affected by Flood’s finding
that baseball was clearly part of interstate commerce; the “rule” remains that
the business of baseball is exempt from federal antitrust laws.163  In order to
define the scope of the exemption, however, this approach would argue that
future courts should look to the general circumstances in the previous
Supreme Court cases for guidance as to what conduct the Court intended its
opinions to govern.  Framed this way, challengers to baseball’s antitrust
exemption can advance an argument that both fits the Supreme Court’s
baseball trilogy and finds support in numerous lower court opinions.  And a
court that is uneasy with the “unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical”164 nature
of the exemption has some middle ground—which can be supported by
more than a single, heavily criticized case—to find the exemption inapplica-
ble to certain situations.  While this approach is not a home run legal argu-
ment, it may be better than relying on a Piazza-reserve clause position.
B. The “Unique Characteristics and Needs” Standard Is a Narrow
but Potentially Persuasive Approach
The “unique characteristics and needs” standard, an alternate standard
used by some courts in determining whether baseball’s antitrust exemption
bars challenges to anticompetitive conduct, may have survived San Jose’s
challenge to the exemption.  The narrow standard applies the baseball
exemption only to limited conduct that is “central enough to the ‘unique
characteristics and needs’ of baseball” to be a part of the sport.165  In recon-
ciling baseball’s antitrust exemption with the antitrust laws that favor compe-
tition, the key distinction under this standard is whether the situation at issue
in a particular case involves “a distinct and separate industry” from base-
ball.166  The standard is based on the statement in Flood that the exemption
160 Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1022, 1025
(Fla. 1994).
161 Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
162 Id. at 437–38.
163 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284–85 (1972).
164 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957).
165 Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 268–69 (S.D. Tex.
1982).
166 Id. at 271.
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“rests on a recognition and an acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics
and needs,”167 which is interpreted as a signal that baseball was not to be
exempt from liability for conduct not touching on those characteristics and
needs.168  While making clear that the court did not necessarily endorse the
more narrow “unique characteristics and needs” test, Judge Whyte concluded
that even under such a test, team relocation “falls squarely within the exemp-
tion” and San Jose’s claims would still be barred by the exemption.169
San Jose asserted that anticompetitive conduct towards cities attempting
to attract struggling teams is not an essential part of baseball nor does such
conduct enhance the vitality or visibility of Major League Baseball.170  How-
ever, this argument fails to actually apply the standard to the facts at issue.
The question under the “unique characteristics and needs” standard is not
whether it is essential for the league to violate antitrust laws in this particular
context, but rather whether the context itself is a unique characteristic or
need of the game.  If the standard were to be applied as the city suggests,
then the question would essentially become whether baseball has a unique
need to violate the antitrust laws in this particular context.  That would
arguably amount to something closer to a reasonableness test.
Part of the confusion over how to apply the standard might come from
the language used in Postema.  The court concluded that “[u]nlike the league
structure or the reserve system, baseball’s relations with non-players are not a
unique characteristic or need of the game.”171  This would seem to suggest
that the proper question was whether the context in question was part of a
unique characteristic and need of the game of baseball.  But in the very next
sentence, the court stated that “[a]nti-competitive conduct toward umpires is
not an essential part of baseball and in no way enhances its vitality or viabil-
ity.”172  This seems to indicate that the court was applying the standard just as
the City of San Jose was, that is to say, by asking whether the anticompetitive
conduct at issue is essential to the game of baseball.  The opinion failed to
explain which interpretation it was applying.
The appropriate application of the “unique characteristics and needs”
standard is further muddled by the fact that Major League Baseball asserted
that Henderson and Postema actually support the league’s argument that the
exemption is broad and encompasses more than simply the reserve clause.173
Judge Whyte ultimately found Major League Baseball’s argument more per-
suasive and concluded that “there can be no dispute that team relocation is a
167 Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
168 Postema v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 799 F. Supp. 1475, 1488 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), rev’d on other grounds, 998 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
169 City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op.
at 17 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants’
motion to dismiss).
170 Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 141, at 6.
171 Postema, 799 F. Supp. at 1489.
172 Id.
173 Defendants’ Reply, supra note 111, at 5 n.7.
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‘league structure’ issue and an ‘essential part of baseball’ that would fall
within the exemption.”174  The court did not endorse or reject the narrower
view of the exemption.  Rather, the opinion rested on other precedent for
the conclusion that team relocation is a component of league structure that
falls squarely within the exemption.175
However, the court’s analysis raises some serious questions as to the
validity of the standard.  First, the court interpreted Henderson and Postema to
stand for the proposition that “certain aspects of baseball, which are merely
related to, but not essential to, the business of baseball . . . are not subject to
the antitrust exemption.”176  Applying that standard, the court analyzed the
issue as a question of whether the conduct is an essential or integral part of
the business of baseball.177  This is different than the precise standard that
was articulated in both Henderson and Postema.  Specifically, those cases
applied the standard of whether the conduct at issue was a unique character-
istic and need of baseball.178  This presents the question of whether there is a
difference between the “unique characteristics and needs” of baseball being
exempt from antitrust law, or, as the San Jose court concluded, issues integral
to baseball being exempt, but not issues merely related to the game.  If there
is a relevant difference, then the question instead becomes, which standard is
more persuasive?
The argument that there is a distinct difference between the two stan-
dards is premised on the fact that something unique to baseball encompasses
less conduct than something integral to baseball.  Something “unique” is
defined as something “without a like or equal”179 while something that is
“integral” is defined as “very important and necessary.”180  Thus, a unique
standard is narrower and would likely place less conduct under the antitrust
exemption than a broader integral standard.  For example, fan attendance is
integral to the game but is not a unique characteristic and need of the game.
The success of movie theaters, museums, and performing arts centers are all
based on consumers as spectators.  A court that considers whether alleged
anticompetitive conduct involves matters integral to the game will be more
likely to answer in the affirmative than if the court was considering whether
the conduct was unique.
174 City of San Jose, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op. at 14.
175 See Prof’l Baseball Sch. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1085–86 (11th Cir.
1982) (holding that the “franchise location system . . . plainly concerns matters that are an
integral part of the business of baseball” (citations omitted)).
176 City of San Jose, No. C-13-02787 RMW, slip op. at 13 (citing Henderson Broad. Corp.
v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 265–72 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Postema, 799 F. Supp. at
1489).
177 Id. at 14.
178 See supra Section II.B.
179 Unique, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unique
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
180 Integral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integral
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
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Next, we must ask which standard is a more persuasive interpretation of
the scope and applicability of baseball’s antitrust exemption. Henderson and
Postema both base the “unique characteristics and needs” standard on a pas-
sage from Flood that the baseball exemption “rests on a recognition and an
acceptance of baseball’s unique characteristics and needs.”181  The court in
Henderson referenced the passage as the standard for whether the “unique
characteristics and needs” of the game have any bearing on the industry and
conduct involved in the action.182  Alternatively, the passage can be inter-
preted as merely providing a justification for the exemption.183  If we take
the former interpretation of the passage, for argument’s sake, then the differ-
ence in the phrasing of the standard results in potentially significantly differ-
ent outcomes.  Under the latter interpretation, the language is not a
standard at all.
The fact that there is a significant difference between which word we use
in the standard reveals the flimsiness of the standard itself and demonstrates
one of the reasons the “unique characteristics and needs” standard is ulti-
mately unpersuasive, regardless of which definition a court applies.  Second,
as demonstrated in City of San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, the
standard is clearly unworkable.  Both parties cite the cases for completely
different propositions.  San Jose cites the standard for the proposition that
conduct that is not unique to the game of baseball is not covered by the
exemption.  Major League Baseball argues that the cases that establish the
standard stand for the proposition that baseball’s antitrust exemption covers
conduct outside of the reserve clause, including league structure.  While this
in and of itself is not necessarily an anomaly in the American judicial system,
when coupled with the internal inconsistency in the cases184 and external
inconsistency between the two cases,185 there appear to be substantial rea-
sons for courts to reject the “unique characteristics and needs” standard in
future cases.
C. Broad, All-Encompassing Exemption
Major League Baseball’s primary stance is that baseball’s exemption is
broad and encompasses all aspects of the business of baseball.186  San Jose
181 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972).
182 Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 541 F. Supp. 263, 271 (S.D. Tex.
1982) (“The issue in the case is not baseball but a distinct and separate industry . . . . The
reserve clause and other ‘unique characteristics and needs’ of the game have no bearing at
all on the questions presented.  To hold that a radio station contract to broadcast baseball
games should be treated differently for antitrust law purposes than a station’s contract to
broadcast any other performance or event would be to extend and distort the specific
baseball exemption, [and] transform it into an umbrella to cover other activities and mar-
kets outside baseball . . . .”).
183 See Grow, supra note 94, at 601.
184 See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
186 Defendants’ Reply, supra note 111, at 2 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent has
established “the broad scope of the exemption”).
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attempted to rebut baseball’s contention by arguing the exemption is limited
to player-labor issues—specifically the reserve clause.187  An argument for a
narrow interpretation finds support in antitrust jurisprudence outside of the
sports context.188  But within the context of baseball’s antitrust exemption,
Judge Whyte noted that “[a]ll federal circuit courts that have considered the
issue . . . have adopted the view that the exemption broadly covers the ‘busi-
ness of baseball.’”189  Exactly how far the exemption extends, however, is far
from clear.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in Charles O. Finley & Co. v.
Kuhn.190  It concluded that, based on Federal Baseball, Toolson, Flood, and
Radovich, it is clear that the Supreme Court “intended to exempt the business
of baseball, not any particular facet of that business, from the federal anti-
trust laws.”191  Major League Baseball relied on Finley in support of a broad
antitrust exemption.192  Judge Whyte, in turn, also approvingly considered
the court’s reasoning in Finley, though the case was not cited for support of
the court’s ultimate conclusion that the exemption is not limited to the
reserve clause.193
However, there may be a valid argument that Flood does not stand for
the proposition that the exemption is all-encompassing like Major League
Baseball contends.  While the Supreme Court at first justified baseball as
being exempt from antitrust laws because it was not a subject of interstate
commerce and was not trade under the Sherman Act,194 that reasoning was
subsequently rejected and the Court instead allowed baseball to continue to
operate without being subject to antitrust laws because Congress had failed to
expressly decide otherwise.195  The doctrinal justification for the exemption,
therefore, is based on the Court’s interpretation of congressional intent in
enacting the antitrust laws, specifically the Court’s interpretation that Con-
gress never intended that baseball be subject to those laws.
187 Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 141, at 6–8.
188 See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982) (“[E]xemptions
from the antitrust laws must be construed narrowly.”).
189 City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 13-CV-02787 RMW, slip op.
at 3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants’
motion to dismiss).
190 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
191 Id. at 541 (footnote omitted).
192 Defendants’ Reply, supra note 111, at 3 (quoting the holding from Finley, 569 F.2d
at 541).
193 City of San Jose, No. 13-CV-02787 RMW, slip op. at 12 (noting the Finley court’s “sub-
stantial analysis” and its observation that the Supreme Court “intended to exempt the busi-
ness of baseball, not any particular facet of that business” (quoting Finley, 569 F.2d at
541)).  Judge Whyte reasoned that “Federal Baseball and Toolson are broadly decided” and
not limited to the reserve clause. Id. at 15.
194 See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 208–09 (1922).
195 See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam).
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A closer look at the congressional record provides greater insight into
Congress’s actual support and opinion regarding the scope of the exemption
and raises questions as to the San Jose court’s reasoning.  A House Judiciary
Committee Report in 1952, based on extensive hearings and consideration of
five proposed bills to alter the baseball exemption, advised against a blanket
antitrust exemption for baseball.196  The subcommittee also concluded that
“courts may have to differentiate the unreasonable features of baseball’s rules
and regulations from those which are reasonable and necessary.”197  Interest-
ingly, the subcommittee closed its report by stating its “earnest desire to avoid
influencing pending litigation,” finding it “unwise to attempt to anticipate
judicial action with legislation.”198  Interpreting the Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Flood as providing professional baseball blanket immunity from anti-
trust laws, a conclusion based on congressional acceptance of Flood and
Toolson, appears to overlook the fact that Congress did not believe that base-
ball was actually granted a complete exemption from the antitrust laws.  If
Congress thought it was not its place to influence the Court and the Court
believed it was Congress’s place to alter the exemption, then the acceptance
of the status quo may lack the substantive evidence of congressional intent
that the Flood Court and courts since have generally presupposed.
In Flood, the Court concluded that “the orderly way to eliminate error or
discrimination” which may result from baseball’s antitrust exemption “is by
legislation and not by court decision.”199  This conclusion was justified, the
Court reasoned, because “[c]ongressional processes are more accommoda-
tive, affording the whole industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the
formulation of new legislation.  The resulting product is therefore more
likely to protect the industry and the public alike.”200  Such a justification
either: (a) is fundamentally flawed and so impractical that it supports
rejecting the conclusion that only Congress can provide a workable correc-
tion to baseball’s antitrust exemption,201 or, perhaps more persuasively, (b)
196 H.R. REP. NO. 82-2002, at 230 (1952) (noting club owners, baseball management,
players, sports writers, and even sponsors of bills proposing a broad antitrust exemption for
baseball all conclude that a carte blanche exemption is unwise).
197 Id. at 232.
198 Id.
199 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972) (quoting Radovich v. Nat’l Football
League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
200 Id.
201 In his Flood dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the Court has repeatedly rejected
such justifications. Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  For example, in Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U.S. 106 (1940), the Court held that:
It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence
to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines.  To explain the cause of
non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to venture into
speculative unrealities. . . . Various considerations of parliamentary tactics and
strategy might be suggested as reasons for the inaction . . . but they would only be
sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the
absence of corrective legislation a controlling legal principle. . . . [W]e cannot
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may support the notion that the Court did not interpret the exemption as
extending to situations like San Jose’s efforts to build a new stadium for the
Oakland Athletics, and similar third party contexts.
The justification that Congress provides a better forum for changing the
antitrust exemption is arguably unsound.  As exemplified by the congres-
sional process in drafting the Curt Flood Act, the parties affected by the
exemption do not have a voice in the congressional forum.  Only players,
owners, and officers of Major League Baseball took part in the drafting of the
Curt Flood Act.202  It is not reasonable or likely that third parties like cities,
media companies, and advertisers have a proper forum to take part in such a
debate on the proper parameters of the exemption because their interests
are not ongoing and the size of a potential class of third parties makes lobby-
ing ineffective.  Cities are unaffected by the exemption unless they currently
have a team or they hope to attract a team.  Current cities would be most
interested in curbing competition to attract their team away from the city,
and at any given time only a few, if any, cities would actively be soliciting
teams to relocate.  Thus, Congress is in fact a poor forum for protecting the
interests of third parties that may be significantly affected by the antitrust
exemption.
Alternatively, it is possible to interpret the Court’s reference to the bene-
fits of a congressional forum as an indication that the Court never meant to
shield baseball from antitrust actions brought by third parties like cities.  As
discussed above, Congress is not a sufficient forum for parties outside of base-
ball to have their concerns heard or addressed.  Rather than committing
such a fundamental lapse in reasoning, perhaps the Court in Flood did not
consider third parties like cities to be barred from bringing antitrust claims
by Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption.  After all, Federal Baseball,
Toolson, and Flood all concerned actions brought by executives of a baseball
team or professional players.203  A third party like San Jose was never refer-
enced in any of the Court’s opinions.  Significantly, the Court in Flood justi-
fied the benefits of the congressional forum on the notion that
“[c]ongressional processes are more accommodative, affording the whole indus-
try hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new legisla-
tion.”204  Clearly, one would not consider a city like San Jose part of the
baseball “industry.”  At best, the city is attempting to join the industry and is
being kept out by the industry’s rules.  A narrow reading of Flood could justify
evade our own responsibility for reconsidering in the light of further experience,
the validity of distinctions which this Court has itself created. . . . Surely we are not
bound by reason or by the considerations that underlie stare decisis to persevere in
distinctions taken in the application of a statute which, on further examination,
appear consonant neither with the purposes of the statute nor with this Court’s
own conception of it.
Id. at 119–22 (footnote omitted).
202 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
203 See supra Section I.A.
204 Flood, 407 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added) (quoting Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 30  8-MAY-14 10:20
1870 notre dame law review [vol. 89:4
a court’s conclusion that the Supreme Court implicitly presumed the anti-
trust exemption only applied to conduct between parties within the baseball
industry, such as players, umpires, league management, and teams.
D. Effect of the Curt Flood Act of 1998 Remains a Doctrinal Challenge
San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball205 also provides a great
example of the continuing debate over the relevant effect of the Curt Flood
Act on antitrust challenges outside of the player-labor context.  Following a
similar conclusion in Morsani v. Major League Baseball,206 the San Jose court
concluded that the Act “provides further support for the Court’s holding in
Flood that Congress does not intend to change the longstanding antitrust
exemption for ‘the business of baseball’ with respect to franchise relocation
issues.”207  While interpreting the Curt Flood Act as an indication that Con-
gress was not intending to change the antitrust exemption is a reasonable
conclusion, the court’s quotation of Morsani may be read to indicate support
for a broader interpretation of the Act.  Specifically, the court quoted Mor-
sani for the proposition that Congress had “preserv[ed] . . . the broadest
aspects of the antitrust exemption” in passing the Curt Flood Act.208
Predictably, Major League Baseball argued that the Act preserved base-
ball’s exemption with respect to all conduct outside of dealings with play-
ers.209  San Jose argued for a more narrow interpretation of Congress’s
intent in passing the Act, arguing that the Act “does not apply to aspects of
baseball other than the employment of major league players.”210  San Jose
further reasoned that Congress would have been aware of the line of cases
limiting the scope of the exemption, and thus the explicit language that the
Act does not affect current case law on the exemption outside of the labor
context should be construed as proof that the Act does not apply to reloca-
tion and league structure issues.211
Judge Whyte seemed to agree with Major League Baseball’s contention,
though the opinion does not devote much attention to the issue.212  The
congressional debate regarding the passage of the Curt Flood Act provides
additional evidence that Congress may not have intended to endorse a broad
205 City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. C-13-02787 RMW (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 11, 2013).
206 79 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
207 City of San Jose, No. 13-CV-02787 RMW, slip op. at 17 (citations omitted).
208 Id. (“Congress explicitly preserved the exemption for all matters ‘relating to or
affecting franchise expansion, location or relocation’ . . . . Congress’ preservation of the
broadest aspects of the antitrust exemption in this recent legislation casts in sharp relief
the misdirection in Butterworth.” (quoting Morsani, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1336 n.12 (citation
omitted))).
209 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 73, at 7.
210 Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 141, at 8.
211 Id.
212 City of San Jose, No. 13-CV-02787 RMW, slip op. at 17 (“The Curt Flood Act provides
further support . . . that Congress does not intend to change the longstanding antitrust
exemption for ‘the business of baseball’ with respect to franchise relocation issues.”).
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exemption from federal antitrust laws.  The Senate Judiciary Committee spe-
cifically noted that the Act “does not affect the applicability or non-applicabil-
ity of the antitrust laws in any other context beyond” player-labor issues.213
At the committee hearing, Senator Orrin Hatch stated that the Act was writ-
ten to make Major League Baseball subject to federal antitrust laws, like all
other professional sport leagues, “except with regard to team relocation, the
minor leagues, and sports broadcasting.”214
During the discussion of the bill, Representative Henry Hyde described
the bill as an agreement between “baseball players, . . . owners, and the minor
leagues . . . on the application of the antitrust laws to labor relations in base-
ball.”215  He further noted that the “bill was carefully drafted . . . to leave the
remainder of the exemption intact” so that “nothing in [the] bill will affect in
any way the protections afforded to the major league clubs by the non-statu-
tory labor antitrust exemption.”216  Of specific relevance to cities like San
Jose, the Congressman stated that the “bill does not affect the application of
the antitrust laws to anyone outside the business of baseball.”217  Representa-
tive John Conyers discussed the need to rectify the “sorry Supreme Court
decision . . . holding that baseball . . . was beyond the reach of antitrust
laws.”218  Of particular relevance, he cited the tens of millions of dollars in
lost tax revenues for cities as a result of the 1994 World Series being can-
celled due to the player strike.219  He went on state that the legislation care-
fully protected professional baseball’s ability to limit franchise relocation.220
The Congressman advised a future court attempting to interpret the Act “to
return to the purpose section of the bill for aid and interpretation,” which
states Congress’s intention “that major league baseball players have the same
rights under antitrust laws as do other professional athletes.”221  Representa-
tive Jim Bunning voiced his opinion that the “exemption should be repealed
altogether” as “[b]aseball is a multibillion dollar business that should have to
play by the same rules as other sports and businesses.”222  Representative
Hutchinson noted that the legislation “recognizes the importance of an anti-
213 S. REP. NO. 105-118, at 6 (1997).
214 Major League Baseball Antitrust Reform: Hearing on S. 53 Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (opening statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm.
on the Judiciary).  It should be noted that the Act itself goes beyond merely exempting
team relocation, the minor leagues, and sports broadcasts.  Specifically, the Act also
excludes umpires and other employees of organized baseball, franchise expansion,
franchise location, franchise ownership issues, relationships between the Office of the
Commissioner and team owners, and intellectual property rights. See Curt Flood Act of
1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b) (2012).
215 144 CONG. REC. 24,328 (1998) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. (statement of Rep. Conyers).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 24,329.
221 Id.
222 Id. (statement of Rep. Bunning).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL412.txt unknown Seq: 32  8-MAY-14 10:20
1872 notre dame law review [vol. 89:4
trust exemption for certain aspects of the game so team owners may continue
to cooperate on issues such as league expansion, franchise location and
broadcast rights.”223
That Congress did not seek to preserve a broad interpretation of the
antitrust exemption by enacting the Curt Flood Act, as Major League Base-
ball contended,224 is directly supported by the congressional record.  Senator
Paul Wellstone specifically raised the issue of the Act’s effect on the lower
court holdings that baseball “enjoys only a narrow exemption from antitrust
laws and that exemption applies only to the reserve system,” citing But-
terworth, Piazza, and the lower state court opinion in the Twins case.225  Sena-
tor Orrin Hatch, in an attempt to clarify the legislative intent of the bill,
stated that it was to have no effect on a court’s ultimate resolution of the
scope of the antitrust exemption in other contexts or with other persons or
entities.226  Senator Leahy also reiterated that the bill was to have no impact
on the recent decisions in Butterworth, Piazza, and Minnesota Twins v. State.227
Senator Bilirakis argued that the bill was “an important first step in cor-
recting” the judicially created baseball antitrust exemption.228  Senator Clay
also questioned the existence of the baseball exemption, referring to Flood as
an “erroneous” decision.229
Interpreting the Curt Flood Act as a preservation of a broad antitrust
exemption is problematic for two reasons.  First, it ignores the explicit indica-
tions by Congress that the Act was not meant to be interpreted as having any
effect on the previously decided cases which interpreted the exemption nar-
rowly, nor was the Act meant to prevent future courts from similarly inter-
preting the exemption in a narrow manner.230  Second, such an
interpretation of the Act would expand and solidify the exemption despite
the fact that the actual catalyst for the Act was to ensure the validity of the
collective bargaining agreement, which had already been agreed to by the
players and Major League Baseball.231  That would mean Major League Base-
ball, in agreeing to support legislation eliminating a portion of the exemp-
tion, which they had already agreed not to rely on, somehow ended up with
an even stronger, more expansive exemption.  Such a confounding result232
should not be created by judicial interpretation.  While baseball players,
223 Id. at 24,330 (statement of Rep. Hutchinson).
224 Defendants’ Reply, supra note 111, at 5 (“Congress expressly preserved the antitrust
exemption when it enacted the Curt Flood Act.”).
225 144 CONG. REC. 24,330 (1998) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
226 Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch).
227 Id. (statement of Sen. Leahy).
228 Id. (statement of Sen. Bilirakis).
229 Id. at 24,331 (statement of Sen. Clay).
230 See supra Section II.D.
231 See Edmonds, supra note 60, at 3.
232 See Wolohan, supra note 60, at 377 (“A reasonable interpretation of Congress’ deci-
sion to only include Major League Baseball players, therefore would be that Congress did
not want the entire business of baseball to be covered under a blanket antitrust
exemption.”).
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through the Major League Baseball Players’ Association, may have consented
to such a result, the labor aspect of the antitrust exemption is only one cate-
gory affected by the exemption.  The substantive rights of third parties, which
were not considered or advocated for during drafting of the Act, should not
be diminished because the players, who only cared about the labor aspects of
the exemption that concerned them, consented to such a change.
CONCLUSION
Ninety years after its judicial creation, the antitrust exemption for pro-
fessional baseball continues to be an anomaly that courts and scholars strug-
gle both to justify and to apply to challenges of anticompetitive conduct by
Major League Baseball.  The most recent challenge to baseball’s exemption
renews the issues with the exemption’s history and the lack of clarity on what
exactly it means.  The Northern District of California confronted these issues
head-on and diligently attempted to make some sense of the muddled prece-
dent dealing with the exemption.
The San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball opinion provides some
valuable persuasive authority for future courts but inevitably leaves questions
remaining and is subject to some criticism for its reasoning.  First, the court
provides another strong rejection of Piazza, the most supportive case for chal-
lengers of the exemption, and adds additional weight to the position that
baseball’s antitrust exemption extends beyond merely the reserve clause.233
This Note concludes that the San Jose court’s opinion should be read by
future challengers to baseball’s antitrust exemption as a signal that relying on
Piazza is not only unlikely to be persuasive but potentially can be fatal to a
challenger’s argument.
Second, the opinion raises some questions regarding the validity of the
“unique characteristics and needs” standard that has been used by previous
courts.  Specifically, the San Jose court exposes the inconsistency in the appli-
cation of the standard and raises questions about the ultimate workability of
the standard.234  A reasoned analysis of that standard leads to the conclusion
that it should be rejected by future courts as too attenuated and ineffectual
to provide any clarity in analyzing the scope and application of professional
baseball’s antitrust exemption.
Third, San Jose addresses Major League Baseball’s argument that the
antitrust exemption broadly covers the entire business of baseball.  The court
did not explicitly endorse such a broad view but indicated that the support of
a broad view is stronger than the much narrower interpretation that the
exemption applies only to the reserve clause.235  This Note challenges the
notion that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Flood should be interpreted as
an affirmation of such a broad interpretation of the exemption.  Rather, the
language in the Flood opinion, and specifically its justification of Congress
233 See supra Section III.A.
234 See supra Section III.B.
235 See supra Section III.C.
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being a better forum for removing the exemption,236 indicates that the
Supreme Court arguably never intended for third parties outside of the base-
ball industry to be barred from challenging anticompetitive conduct by the
league. Flood should correctly be interpreted by future courts as evidence
that Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption only shields the league
from challenges by teams, employees, and other parties that are part of the
baseball industry and challenges to conduct that principally concerns only
the baseball industry.
Finally, the San Jose court addresses the effect of the Curt Flood Act on
the breadth of baseball’s antitrust exemption.  The court endorses the rea-
soning that the Act demonstrates Congress preserved a broad antitrust
exemption.237  This conclusion is flawed and should be rejected because it
ignores the explicit warnings by Congress that the Act was not meant to be
interpreted as having any effect on the previously decided cases238 and
because such an interpretation of the Act would expand the exemption
despite the fact that the Act was a response to requests by baseball and its
players to solidify labor relations.239  The substantive rights of the rest of the
baseball industry and third parties, including cities, should not be dimin-
ished by the narrow consent of only a subset of the parties affected by the
exemption.
236 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 279 (1972).
237 See supra Section III.D.
238 See supra Section II.D.
239 See Edmonds, supra note 60, at 3.
